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MEGAN'S LAW SHOULD SURVIVE THE
LATEST ROUND OF ATTACKS
DONNA-MARIE KORTH* AND CANDACE REID GLADSTON**
On May 7, 1998, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York once again held unconstitutional certain procedures
under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"),
commonly referred to as Megan's Law. 1 In Doe v. Pataki,2 the
district court found SORA's provisions that establish procedures
for assigning risk level classifications to convicted sex offenders
to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process. 3
* Donna-Marie Korth is a member of Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, and
practices in the firm's commercial/real estate litigation department. She is admitted to
practice in New York State and before the United States District Courts for the Eastern
and Southern Districts of New York and the United States Supreme Court. She previ-
ously concentrated in cooperative/condominium law and presently represents a number
of boards of residential community developments. Ms. Korth co-authored Megan's Law
Before the Second Circuit, published in the New York Law Journal.
Active in the Nassau County Bar Association, Ms. Korth is the Vice Chair of the Ap-
pellate Practice Committee and a member of the Environmental Law Committee and the
Moot Court Advisory Board. She also serves as a liaison to the Nassau Academy of Law
and has moderated and lectured at several CLE seminars. She was appointed to the Ad-
visory Committee of the 18B Panel of Nassau County and the MCLE Task Force of the
Nassau County Bar Association. She is a member of the Telicare Community Action
Board, Mercy Medical Center Junior League, and Rockville Centre Guild for the Arts.
Ms. Korth is a magna cum laude graduate of St. John's University and holds a juris doc-
torate, with honors, from the St. John's University School of Law.
** Candace Reid Gladston practices as an associate in the Civil Litigation and Crimi-
nal Defense Departments at Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP. Ms. Gladston, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, received her undergraduate degree, summa cum laude, in
Political Science, from Columbia University in 1984. In 1987, she earned her Juris Doc-
tor from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law where she was honored with the Felix
Frankfurter Award.
Ms. Gladston co-authored Megan's Law Before the Second Circuit, published in the
February 26, 1997 issue of the New York Law Journal. She also co-authored Arbitration
of Strike Misconduct Cases Arising Out of Legal Strikes, published in The Arbitration
Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1984.
Ms. Gladston is admitted to practice in the state of New York, as well as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the United States District Court,
Southern, Eastern, and Western Districts of New York.
1 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168 to 168-v (McKinney 1998).
2 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Doe 1].
3 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 461-63. Each convicted sex offender subject to SORA's
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SORA, like many other sex offender laws across the country,
was enacted in response to the alarming statistics demonstrating
that a staggering number of children are sexually molested each
year in the United States, that sex offenders have a high rate of
recidivism and are one of the most difficult classes of offenders to
rehabilitate. 4 SORA, which was enacted on July 25, 1995, and
became effective on January 21, 1996, requires sex offenders to
register with the Division of Criminal Justice Services
("DCJS").5 Additionally, under limited circumstances, SORA
provides for the public dissemination of certain registration in-
formation on a sex offender. This information may be obtained
from a local law enforcement agency or a "900" telephone num-
ber maintained by the local law enforcement agency. 6
SORA is applicable not only to sex offenders sentenced after
the effective date, but also to those incarcerated or institution-
alized and on probation or parole on that date.7 Indeed, the ret-
roactive application of SORA has led to constitutional challenges,
and will undoubtedly lead to more.8 The constitutionality of the
public notification provisions of SORA, as well as other states'
provisions has been or will be classified at one of the following levels: (1) risk level one,
requiring restricted level of notification; (2) risk level two, permitting limited public noti-
fication; or (3) risk level three, permitting the broadest amount of public notification.
Identifying information about the offender may be disseminated depending upon the risk
level classification. Id. For level one offenders, SORA provides only for notification of the
offender's address to a local law enforcement agency. Id.; see also N.Y. Correct. Law §
168-1(6)(a) (West Supp. 1999). For level two offenders, the law provides that local law en-
forcement agencies may disseminate an approximate address based upon the offender's
zip code, a photograph, and certain background information to any entity with vulnerable
populations (such as schools). Id. at § 168-1(6)(b). A level three offender is deemed a
"sexually violent predator" and the law provides for a subdirectory containing explicit
identifying information including the exact address of the offender which may be pro-
vided by police agencies to entities with vulnerable populations. Id. at § 168-1(6)(c).
Moreover, "any entity receiving information on a sex offender may disclose or further
disseminate such information at their discretion." Id. at § 168-1(6)(b), (c).
4 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168 (West Supp. 1999) (stating legislative findings that
danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders, and protection of public from these offenders
is of paramount concern to government); 139 Cong. Rec. H10,321 (daily ed. Nov. 20,
1993) (statement of Rep. Ramstad) (explaining that child sex offenders repeat their crime
to point of compulsion).
5 N.Y. Correct. Law § 168 (West Supp. 1999).
6 N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-p and q.
7 N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-p and q (West Supp. 1999). See People v. Afrika, 648
N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Article 6-c of N.Y Correct. Law, effective January 21,
1996, is applicable not only to sex offenders sentenced after that date, but also to those
incarcerated or on probation or parole on that date).
8 See Matter of Parolee v. Calabrese, 246 A.D. 2d 53, 54 (2d Dep't 1998) (holding that
N.Y. Correction Law § 168 does not violate ex post facto clause of United States Constitu-
tion).
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sex offender registration laws,9 have been challenged by sex of-
fenders who were convicted prior to the passage of SORA. These
offenders have argued that the notification provision is quintes-
sentially punitive in nature and violative of the Ex Post Facto
Clause in the Constitution, which forbids all laws that increase
punishment after the commission of the crime.
In 1996, a number of convicted sex offenders challenged the
retroactive application of SORA's registration and public notifi-
cation provisions in Doe v. Pataki.10 The District Court for the
Southern District of New York held the registration provisions of
SORA to be regulatory and not punitive in nature whereas ret-
roactive application of the notification provisions would violate
the ex post facto clause. 11
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court with respect to the notification provisions, holding
that such requirements do not constitute punishment for pur-
poses of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 12 The United States Supreme
Court subsequently denied certiorari. 13 On remand for further
proceedings on plaintiffs' remaining due process and statutory
claims, the district court held that the sex offenders on parole or
probation when SORA became effective were denied due process
under SORA's classification procedures. The court, therefore,
permanently enjoined any classification of this group of sex of-
fenders at a level higher than risk level one unless and until
those offenders are reclassified by a court in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the court's decision. 14 Additionally, the
court permitted the complaint to be amended to add a class of
convicted sex offenders who were incarcerated on SORA's effec-
tive date, and preliminarily enjoined this group's classification
above risk level one unless and until they are reclassified under
the same procedures.15
9 See People v. Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 241 (finding SORA does not contravene ex
post facto clause); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12 (1995) (finding registration and commu-
nity notification provisions of New Jersey's sex offender registration act constitutional);
State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1062 (Wash. 1994) (upholding notification provisions of
Washington's sex offender registration statute).
10 940 F. Supp. 603, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
11 Seeld. at 631.
12 See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1265 (2d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Doe I].
13 See Doe v. Pataki, 118 S.Ct. 1066, 1066 (1998)[hereinafter Doe III].
14 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d. at 472.
15 See Id. at 475.
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The procedures for assigning individual risk levels are the
subject of heated debate. These procedures have generated sig-
nificant controversy primarily because the risk level assigned to
a convicted sex offender determines the amount of information
about the offender that can be disseminated to the public under
SORA's notification procedures. 16 Proponents of SORA focus on
the safety risks to children, citing instances of sexually muti-
lated children, and argue that the release of information about
level two and level three sex offenders in communities is neces-
sary to protect the public at large.17 Opponents focus on the pos-
sibility that convicted sex offenders will be mistakenly classified
at levels two or three solely because of inadequate procedural
safeguards, thereby permitting public release of identifying in-
formation about offenders that could result in harassment and
stigmatization. 18
As a result of the district court's latest ruling in Doe v. Pataki,
there are now over 6,000 convicted sex offenders19 living among
us, whose registration information cannot be disseminated be-
cause they cannot be classified at a risk level higher than level
one, regardless of the severity of their crimes. This grievous
situation will exist until there is a judicial re-classification in ac-
cordance with the procedures set forth in the district court's
opinion 20 or until Doe v. Pataki is overturned on appeal. 2 1
According to the district court, SORA does not provide the
minimum procedural safeguards required under the due process
16 See N.Y. Correct. Law §168-1(6)(a)-(c).
17 See Simeon Schopf, Megan's Law: Community Notification and the Constitution,
29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 117 (1995) (illustrating how young girl Megan Kanka
was raped and strangled to death by her sex offender neighbor); Julia A. Houston, Note,
Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV.
729, 729 (1994) (discussing how convicted child molester Joseph Gallardo refused treat-
ment while in prison and upon release, he still had sexual fantasies about children);
Ex-Con Arrested in Sexual Mutilation of Young Boy, UPI, May 22, 1989, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
18 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d. at 469-470.
19 See Judge: Section of Megan's Law Unconstitutional, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 8, 1998,
at A46. According to statements attributed to Thomas M. O'Brien, a lawyer with The
Legal Aid Society, this most recent District Court ruling "will affect more than 6,000 sex
offenders who were on probation or parole or were released shortly after the law took ef-
fect." Id.
20 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp.2d at 479. Apparently, Judge Chin does not believe New
York's Legislature is able to provide due process protection under SORA since he has set
forth a list of procedures that all state courts must follow.
21 As of this writing, the Attorney General's office has filed a notice of appeal and
will perfect same on or before May 1, 1998.
MEGAN'S LAW
clause of the Constitution with respect to the administrative
classification of convicted sex offenders who were on parole or
probation on SORA's effective date. 22 The court based its opinion
on the fact that these classifications were not made by a court
with the full panoply of procedural safeguards, such as notice, a
hearing, discovery and appointment of counsel. 23 The opinion
also indicated that there are constitutional deficiencies in
SORA's procedures for classifying all other convicted sex offend-
ers, notwithstanding the fact that these individuals are afforded
notice, a judicial hearing, and appointment of counsel. 24 Judge
Chin's complaint, however, appears not to be with SORA's pro-
cedures concerning judicial classifications as much as it is with
what he perceives to be the failure by the majority of the state's
supreme court justices to properly implement SORA's procedures
before assigning risk levels in individual cases.25
The different procedures for classifying the two categories of
convicted sex offenders and the absence of a provision giving sex
offenders a direct right of judicial appeal from a risk level de-
termination, understandably raises concerns and renders SORA
vulnerable to procedural attack.26 As this article will discuss,
however, SORA's provisions should ultimately withstand the
constitutional and statutory attacks upon its classification pro-
cedures.
THE STATUTORY AND DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
SORA's statutory scheme creates two distinct categories of
convicted sex offenders with respect to classification procedures:
(1) those who were on parole or probation at the time SORA be-
came effective (the "Parolee-Probationer" category); and (2) all
other convicted sex offenders, including those who were incar-
cerated or institutionalized and not yet released, paroled or dis-
charged on SORA's effective date.27 As discussed herein, this
22 See DoeI, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
23 See Id.
24 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-d and n (McKinney Supp. 1999).
25 See Doel, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
26 See People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d 270, 278 (1998) (explaining that neither Megan's
law nor CPL allow criminal appeal leaving court with "no alternative source of author-
ity").
27 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-d, -g, -n (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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statutory scheme is logical and justified under well-established
legal precedent.
In the Parolee-Probationer category, convicted sex offenders'
risk levels are determined by either the Division of Parole
("DOP") or the Department of Probation and Correctional Alter-
natives ("DPCA") without notice or a hearing before the risk
level is determined. 28 In contrast, all other convicted sex offend-
ers, including those still incarcerated or institutionalized on
SORA's effective date, were and are classified by the original
sentencing court after notice, appointment of counsel if neces-
sary, and a full hearing. 29 There is no express statutory provi-
sion for a direct right of appeal from a judicial risk level classifi-
cation.30
Four questions immediately arise upon an analysis of SORA's
classification provisions: (1) Whether the state can justify treat-
ing Parolee-Probationers procedurally different from all other
convicted sex offenders; (2) whether the risk assessment instru-
ment promulgated by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders
("Board")31 and utilized by the Board, the DOP, 32 the DPCA33
and the courts to determine risk levels, arbitrarily assigns nu-
merical values to specific risk factors; (3) whether SORA's classi-
fication procedures result in accurate risk level assessments; and
(4) whether an appeal lie from a judicial risk level determination
in the absence of an express statutory provision therefor?
CONVICTED SEX OFFENDERS ON PAROLE OR PROBATION OR
INCARCERATED ON SORA's EFFECTIVE DATE ARE AFFORDED
SUFFICIENT PROCEDURAL PROTECTION UNDER SORA
The primary constitutional attacks on SORA's classification
procedures are directed at the absence of (1) notice, (2) appoint-
28 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-g (West Supp. 1999).
29 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-d(3), n(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
30 See Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d at 278-79 (holding trial court's risk level assessment was
not appealable pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law).
31 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999). The Board consists of
five members appointed by Governor, three of whom are DOP employees and "experts in
the field of the behavior and treatment of sex offenders" and two of whom are from
DPCA. Id.
32 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-g(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (identifying Division of
Parole, Department of Probabtion and Correction as authorized to apply risk factors).
33 See id.
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ment of counsel and (3) a judicial hearing prior to classification
of convicted sex offenders in the Parolee-Probationer category. 34
The absence of such procedural safeguards is even more appar-
ent because these procedures are specifically provided to all
other convicted sex offenders, including those who were incar-
cerated or institutionalized on SORA's effective date.
The risk level classifications for the Parole-Probationer cate-
gory were made by the DOP or the DPCA with the assistance of
the Board. 35 The convicted sex offenders in this category were
then notified in writing of the risk levels assigned, the duties
imposed by SORA, and the right to administratively appeal the
agency's determination within twenty days. 36
The court found that SORA's procedures do not provide the
necessary safeguards to prevent a deprivation of the constitu-
tionally protected liberty interests of the convicted sex offenders
in the Parolee-Probationer category. 37 According to the court,
each of these convicted sex offenders has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest, apparently in his good name, and the
right to privacy recognized and protected by the state, both of
which could be significantly harmed by an erroneous risk level
determination. 38 On this ground, the district court held that
SORA's administrative classification procedures do not meet the
constitutional standards of due process. 39
Not satisfied with simply finding SORA's administrative clas-
sification provisions unconstitutional, the court appeared to step
into the shoes of the state legislature and essentially re-wrote
SORA to provide for judicial classification of the Pa-
rolee-Probationer category of convicted sex offenders. 40 This ju-
dicial "legislation" provides for written notice to Pa-
rolee-Probationer convicted sex offenders; the right to counsel
and pre-hearing discovery; the right to seek a stay of notification
while making an application to a state appellate court; and the
34 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
35 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999). A member of the Board,
or a designee, reviewed each case prior to the final risk level assignment. Id.; Doe 1, 3 F.
Supp. 2d. at 472.
36 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-g (McKinney Supp. 1999); see also Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d
at 463.
37 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 470-73.
40 See id. at 478.
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burden of persuasion on the state to justify the proposed risk
level and manner of notification.4 1
The soundness of the district court's latest ruling may be ques-
tioned on at least two grounds. It is certainly doubtful whether
convicted sex offenders have "good names" deserving of constitu-
tional protection under the rubric of liberty interests. 42 Moreo-
ver, convicted sex offenders within the Parolee-Probationer cate-
gory are not similarly situated to other members of society.43
Convicted sex offenders on parole or probation on SORA's ef-
fective date were under the active administrative supervision of
trained officials of the DOP. Not only is there "no Federal or
State constitutional right for an inmate to be released before
serving his full sentence," but it is well recognized that "the
State has the discretion to place conditions on parole release."44
In this state, the authority of the DOP to impose conditions upon
an offender under parole supervision has long been absolute and
beyond judicial review as long as no positive statutory require-
ment is violated.45 What could be more logical than for the Leg-
islature to give responsibility to classify this category of con-
victed sex offenders to the administrative agency having
supervision over them? 46 There do not appear to be the requisite
liberty interests at stake sufficient to invoke the procedural
guarantees contained in the federal and state constitutions for
those in the Parolee-Probationer category of convicted sex of-
fenders.
Additionally, just because this category of sex offenders was
classified by an administrative agency rather than by a court
does not automatically mean that there were no procedural safe-
guards to assure accurate classifications. These convicted sex of-
fenders had the right to challenge their risk level classifications
by taking an administrative appeal as of right.47 They also could
41 See id. at 470.
42 See Doe II, 120 F.3d 1263, 1280 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing consequences of convic-
tion of crimes in general and sex offenses in particular).
43 See Doe 1, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that in order to invoke
procedural guarantees of Fourteenth Amendment, "the governmental action must 'alter a
right or status previously recognized by state law."').
44 See M.G. v. Travis, 236 A.D.2d 163, 167 (1st Dep't 1997).
45 See Brigugio v. Board of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 29 (1969) (noting action of Board is
not reviewable if done lawfully).
46 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-g(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
47 See N.Y. Exec. Law §259i(4)(a), (b) (McKinney 1993)(providing that offender on
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have sought judicial review of the agency's determinations
through an Article 78 proceeding as of right.48 Additionally,
SORA itself provides a procedure for petitioning the court for re-
lief from the requirement to register, which impliedly encom-
passes the determination of a risk level assessment.49
The Legislature plainly did not intend to prevent judicial re-
view of the DOP's or the DPCA's risk level determinations under
SORA or it easily could have done so as it did with respect to
other determinations made by the agency having supervision
over offenders on parole or probation and under the supervision
of the DOP as set forth in N.Y. Executive Law § 259-i(5).50
Moreover, whether the risk level designation was made by an
administrative agency or by the sentencing court, the designa-
tion was and is made by utilizing the Risk Assessment Guide-
lines ("Guidelines") developed by the Board.5 1 These Guidelines
were created to conform to the criteria set forth in SORA 52 and
to achieve maximum uniformity and objectivity based upon the
perceived risk of re-offense. 53 Accordingly, whether the risk level
assignment was made by an administrative agency or by the
court, the facts of each case were reviewed utilizing the same
uniform, objective Guidelines, and with the Board's oversight
and recommendation. 54
parole or probation may appeal from determination by parole agency and has right to
have attorney appointed if necessary); Doe v. Division of Probation and Correction Alter-
natives, 658 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1997) (noting DPCA has established admin-
istrative review process).
48 See Doe v. Division of Probation and Correction Alternatives, 654 N.Y.S.2d 268
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1997) (reviewing risk assessment made by DPCA under arbitrary and ca-
pricious or abuse of discretion standard in Article 78 proceeding); Youngs v. Division of
Probation and Correction Alternatives, 667 N.Y.S.2d 1021, 1023-24 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1997)
(reviewing risk assessment made by DPCA under arbitrary and capricious or abuse of
discretion standard in Article 78 proceeding).
49 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-g(4), -o (McKinney Supp. 1999).
50 See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-I (5) (McKinney 1993) (expressly providing "[a]ny action
by the board [of parole] or by a hearing officer pursuant to this article shall be deemed ajudicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law"); Doe v. Di-
vision of Probation and Correction Alternatives, 654 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.
1997)(noting that DPCA has established an administrative review process).
51 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(6), 168-d(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999); see also Practice
Commentaries, N.Y. Correct. Law §168 (McKinney 1997)(stating generally it is duty of
court applying guidelines to determine duration of registration and notification); Sex Of-
fender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary (Nov. 1997), at 4
[hereinafter Guidelines].
52 See N.Y. Correct. Law §168-1(5) (McKinney Supp. 1999)(setting forth bases for
Board's development of guidelines).
53 Guidelines, supra note 51, at 3.
54 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(6) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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In sum, SORA's procedures for administratively classifying
convicted sex offenders who were on parole or probation on its
effective date appear to provide sufficient procedural due process
to withstand attacks upon its constitutionality. Indeed, "[d]ue
process requirements are flexible and call for such procedural
protection as the particular situation demands."55 In this par-
ticular situation, at the time of classification, the convicted sex
offenders were under the active supervision of the classifying
agency, and they had a right to challenge their classifications in
a judicial proceeding. Thus it cannot be said that these sex of-
fenders were denied due process.
THE GUIDELINES ARE NEITHER VAGUE NOR ARBITRARY AND ARE
RATIONALLY RELATED TO THE RISK LEVEL DESIGNATIONS
In accordance with SORA's mandate, the Guidelines were de-
veloped by the Board. 56  The Guidelines are a detailed,
point-based system, which assign numerical values to fourteen
risk factors, in four different categories relating to the sex of-
fender's current offense, criminal history, post-offense behavior
and planned release environment. 57 A presumptive risk level is
55 See Doe v. Division of Probation and Correction Alternatives, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
56 See N.Y. Correct. Law §168-1(5) (McKinney Supp. 1999) C'The board shall develop
guidelines and procedures to assess the risk of a repeat offense by such sex offender and
the threat posed to the public safety.").
57 See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(5)a-i (McKinney Supp. 1999). The Guidelines are
based upon the following factors:
(a) criminal history factors indicating a high risk of repeat offense, including:
(i) whether the sex offender has a mental abnormality;
(ii) whether the sex offender's conduct was found to be characterized by repetitive
and compulsive behavior, associated with drugs or alcohol;
(iii) whether the sex offender served the maximum term;
(iv) whether the sex offender committed the felony sex offense against a child;
(v) the age of the sex offender at the time of the commission of the first sex offense;
(b) other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk, including:
(i) the relationship between such sex offender and the victim;
(ii) whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence or infliction of seri-
ous bodily injury;
(iii) the number, date, and nature of prior offenses;
(c) conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including: whether the sex
offender is under supervision, receiving counseling, therapy or treatment, or residing
in a home situation that provides guidance and supervision;
(d) physical conditions that minimize risk of re-offense, including advanced age or
debilitating illness;
(e) whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism;
(M the sex offender's response to treatment;
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calculated for an offender by adding the points assigned to him
in each category. 58 Departures up or down from the presumptive
risk level are permissible if "there exists an aggravating or miti-
gating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately
taken into account by the [G]uidelines." 59 The Guidelines and
the use of a numerical methodology to calculate risk levels were
developed by the Board based upon specific criteria set forth in
SORA. 60
The Board appears to have developed the Guidelines with
painstaking care, mindful of the gravity of the result of its appli-
cation.6 1 The end result of the Board's endeavor was the creation
of an objective instrument that should accomplish the legislative
goal of assigning risk levels for sex offenders in a uniform man-
ner. It "bring[s] academic knowledge and practical acumen to
the difficult task of predicting whether a person convicted of a
(g) recent behavior, including behavior while confined;
(h) recent threats or gestures against persons or expressions of intent to commit ad-
ditional offenses; and
(i) review of any victim impact statement.
Id.
58 See id.
59 See People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1997); see also Doe v. Pa-
taki, 120 F. 3d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting Board may only depart from presump-
tive risk level if mitigating circumstances are present).
60 See Guidelines, supra note 51, at 5. The risk assessment instrument is divided
into four parts: "Current Offense[s]; Criminal History; Post-Offense Behavior; and Re-
lease Environment." Id. Each category includes various factors (i.e., under the current
offense(s) category, such factors considered are: use of violence, sexual contact with the
victim, number of victims, and duration of the offense conduct with the victim). Id. There
are numerical values assigned to each risk factor (i.e., 20 points are assigned if there
were two victims, 30 points if there were three or more victims). The presumptive risk
level is calculated by adding the points that the offender receives in each category. "If
the total score is 70 points or less, the offender is presumptively level 1; if more than 70
but less than 110, he is presumptively level 2; if 110 or more, he is presumptively level
3." Id. at 3. Additionally, the Guidelines contain four "overrides" that automatically re-
sult in a presumptive risk level of 3: "(i) a prior felony conviction for a sex crime; (ii) the
infliction of serious physical injury or the causing of death; (iii) a recent threat to reof-
fend; or (iv) a clinical assessment that the offender has a psychological, physical, or or-
ganic abnormality that decreases his ability to control impulsive sexual behavior." Id. at
3-4.
61 See Guidelines, supra note 51, at 23-24. The Guidelines "were developed with the
assistance of a group of experts with diverse experience in dealing with sex offenders,"
which included consultation with a national expert and author on the subject of sex of-
fenders, reference to Guidelines adopted by other states and review of myriad academic
publications. Id. The Board, assisted by experts, made revisions "in an effort to make [the
instrument] as objective as possible." Id. at 23. Following review and testing of the
Guidelines by a panel of experts, comprised of professionals with diverse and in depth
experience relating to the behavior and treatment of sex offenders, the Board modified
the Guidelines to incorporate various recommendations and to address concerns of the
experts. Id. at 23-24.
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sex crime is likely to reoffend."62 Indeed, the Board has cau-
tioned against applying the Guidelines without first "carefully
studying th[e] commentary," which explains the rationale behind
each factor. 63 Moreover, as further protection of the sex of-
fender's substantial interests that are at stake, the Guidelines
provide that points may not be assessed for a factor "unless there
is clear and convincing evidence of the existence of that factor."64
Notably, the federal sentencing guidelines are not as protective
of convicted offender's rights since sentencing factors "need only
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy due proc-
ess."65 The courts are consistent, however, in their approval of
the risk assessment instrument and have found it to be "fair and
objective," 66 with a "rational basis for the classifications." 67
Further, placing numerical values to the various factors re-
sulting in an aggregate score is not a new concept, nor is it a ba-
sis for faulting the risk assessment instrument. The federal sen-
tencing guidelines utilize similar scoring devices and have
withstood due process attack. 68 Simply put, "[t]he risk assess-
ment instrument is merely the codification of [SORA's] guide-
lines in a uniform and detailed document."69 Thus, the manner
of developing the Guidelines and the use of a numerical method-
ology to calculate risk levels will likely continue to withstand
constitutional challenges. 70
62 See id. at 1.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 5.
65 See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 899 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 1990) (sentencing
factors need only be proved by preponderance of evidence to satisfy due process); U.S. v.
Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223, 230 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that preponderance of evidence stan-
dard is sufficient); U.S. v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding "the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard satisfies requisite due process in determining relevant
conduct pursuant to the sentencing guidelines").
66 See People v. Cropper, 651 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1022 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1996). Justice
Marks observed: 'This Court cannot imagine a more thorough and complete process to
develop and implement a fair and objective assessment instrument that would meet the
goal of the legislation." Id.
67 People v. Nieves, 659 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1997).
68 See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. §3553 (1985). See, e.g., U.S. v.
Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1989) (sentence determined by aggregate of weight
accorded various factors under sentencing guidelines was not denial of due process).
69 See People v. Cropper, 651 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1996).
70 See id. at 1022 (upholding risk assessment instrument and finding no due process
or equal protection violations); Nieves, 659 N.Y.S. 2d at 975 (upholding Guidelines as
"reasonable intrusions upon the individuars privacy for the protection of society").
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APPLICATION OF THE GUIDELINES IS NOT A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS
While the Guidelines were designed to be followed to promote
uniformity, they also provide for the ability to depart from them
"if special circumstances warrant."7 1 "The ability to depart from
the Guidelines is premised on a recognition that an objective in-
strument, no matter how well designed, will not fully capture the
nuances of every case." 72 Thus, "[n]ot to allow for departures
would therefore deprive the Board or the court of the ability to
exercise sound judgment and to apply its expertise to the of-
fender."7 3
The Board also recognized that the risk assessment instru-
ment should not be mechanically applied, but instead should be
applied after "carefully studying th[e] commentary," and that
there should be a "review [of] the case file to determine what oc-
curred."74 A review of the cases in which courts have been called
upon to review administrative classifications 75 or to make the
initial classification, 76 demonstrates that the state courts are
giving careful consideration to each individual case, as required
under the Guidelines.
Further, the courts have not demonstrated a propensity to
merely adopt a presumptive risk level recommended by the
Board, without independent review. 77 For example, the court in
71 See Guidelines, supra note 51, at 4.
72 See id.
73 See id. The Guidelines recognize that departures, upward or downward, should be
the exception and not the rule, otherwise "the objective instrument would be of minimal
value." Id. Thus, as a general rule, "the Board or court may not depart from the pre-
sumptive risk level unless it concludes that there exists an aggravating or mitigating fac-
tor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guide-
lines." Id.
74 See id. at 1, 5.
75 See Doe v. Division of Probation and Correction Alternatives, 654 N.Y.S.2d 268
(Sup. Ct. 1997); Youngs v. Division of Probation and Correction Alternatives, 667 N.Y.S.
2d 1021 (N.Y. Co. 1997).
76 See, e.g., People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S. 2d 881, 884 (N.Y. Sup. 1997) (court per-
forms its own assessment); People v. Ayten, 658 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997)
(same); People v. Lombardo, 640 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1996) (same).
77 See N.Y. Correct. Law §168-n (McKinney Supp. 1999). The Board makes its rec-
ommendation to the court 60 days prior to the release of the sex offender and after at
least two Board members have independently reviewed all of the evidence submitted for
that particular case, the risk assessment instrument, and after a third member has given
a final review to the information. Id. After the Board forwards its recommendation to the
court, the court has 30 days to schedule a hearing, notify the offender, arrange for the
appointment of counsel if necessary, review the file, and hold the hearing, after which,
the sex offender is assigned a risk level. Id.
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People v. Lombardo78 departed upward one level from the pre-
sumptive risk level recommended by the Board after its own in
depth analysis of the facts of the case and the applicable Guide-
lines. The court in People v. Ayten 79 departed downward one
level from the presumptive risk level recommended by the
Board, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances of
the case and, in particular, the sex offender's change of heart in
accepting responsibility for his crime.80 Additionally, even
though the court in People v. Salaam81 abided by the Board's
recommendation, it did so only after performing its own inde-
pendent review of all relevant factors. 82 There is no indication
that the courts have or will abdicate their obligations under
SORA. On the contrary, the courts have demonstrated that they
take their responsibilities very seriously when making risk level
assignments. 83
The Guidelines require that there be clear and convincing evi-
dence of each factor before it can be applied under the risk as-
sessment instrument. Thus, even if the court reviews the
Board's determination under an arbitrary and capricious or
abuse of discretion standard, the court would still be required to
consider whether there existed clear and convincing evidence of
each factor applied by the Board.8 4 This will ensure a high level
78 See Lombardo, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 996. The court departed downward because the sex
offender's conduct did not precisely fit the conduct defined by the particular risk factor,
and the court deemed it appropriate, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, to raise the
risk level at which the defendant was classified. Observing that the risk level calculated
from aggregating the numerical values assigned to the various factors as recommended
by the Board "is 'presumptive' only" and that the court "may depart from it, up or down,"
the judge concluded that "the potential threat posed by this defendant to the safety of the
very young warrants more than merely a minimal dissemination of information about
him to the public." Id.
79 658 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. 1997) (moving downward one level based upon
finding that Board's assessment was arbitrary and capricious).
80 See id. at 574.
81 666 N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1997). See People v. Jimenez, 679 N.Y.S.2d 510,
512 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (reasoning that legislature did not intend to place burden to act
merely as regulatory body to confirm determination of board on New York criminal
courts).
82 See Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (court should not merely confirm the Board's rec-
ommendation absent finding of arbitrariness, but should perform independent review of
applicable factors taking into account testimony and other evidence presented at judicial
hearing).
83 See People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251-52 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (discussing applicable
standard of proof in determining whether to adopt presumptive risk level).
84 See Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
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of protection to sex offenders. 85 Whatever the degree of deference
given to the Board's recommendations, however, SORA itself ex-
pressly mandates that courts make an independent determina-
tion with respect to the level of risk and the corresponding level
of notification.86
AN APPEAL PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 78 OF THE CPLR IS AVAILABLE
TO CHALLENGE A JUDICIAL CLASSIFICATION
Controversy exists with respect to SORA's failure to provide a
direct right to appeal from a judicial determination of a sex of-
fender's risk assessment under SORA. 87 Recent cases demon-
strate that the courts are not in agreement as to how such an
appeal may or may not be pursued.8 8 For example, in People v.
Stevens,89 the Court of Appeals made clear that no right of ap-
peal lies from a risk level determination pursuant to the Crimi-
nal Procedure Law ("CPL").90
The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a judicially
determined risk level assignment constitutes a final disposition
of the original criminal sentence, which would seemingly permit
a right of appeal under the CPL.91 The court reasoned that a
judgment from a criminal conviction "incorporates both 'a convic-
tion and the sentence imposed thereon and is completed by im-
position and entry of the sentence'." 92 Since the criminal action
is terminated by the time the risk assessment determination is
made, such determination is not part of the criminal proceed-
ing.93 Thus, the CPL provides no right to appeal from that de-
85 See Guidelines, supra note 51, at 5; N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-1(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1999).
86 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-d(3), -n(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
87 See People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d 270, 278 (1998) (holding judicial determination of
risk level assessment may not be appealed pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law); People
v. Rodriguez, 240 A.D.2d 351, 351 (1st Dep't 1997) ("Nlo avenue exists to appeal a judi-
cial determination of a sex offender's risk assessment under New York's Sex Offender
Registration Act."),
88 There is no doubt that an administrative determination of a risk assessment may
be challenged pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR. See Doe v. Division of Probation and
Correction Alternatives, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 272; Youngs v. Division of Probation and Cor-
rection Alternatives, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 1023.
89 See Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d at 272.
90 See id. at 278.
91 See id. at 279.
92 See id. at 276.
93 See id.
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termination. 94 Clearly, appealing from a judgment of conviction,
which is part of the criminal proceeding, is not the same as ap-
pealing from a risk level classification, which is in the nature of
a civil proceeding.
Nor does such an appeal lie pursuant to Article 78 by writ of
prohibition. In Raphael S. v. Leventhal,95 the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department held that the "writ of prohibition does
not lie" to challenge a judicial determination of a sex offender's
risk level classification. 96 The reasoning underlying this conclu-
sion is sound.97 In none of the reported cases discussed herein,
was the challenge to the court's risk level determination made
upon the ground that the court acted without or in excess of
authority. 98 Nor could it have been since SORA explicitly
authorizes the courts to make such determinations. 99 Therefore,
the writ of prohibition is inapplicable to review judicial risk level
determinations. 10 0
The appropriate method of review of a judicial risk level de-
termination appears to be found under Article 78 by way of
mandamus or certiorari. 101 Section 7803 of the CPLR which pre-
scribes the scope of Article 78 review, sets forth the only matters
that may be raised in such a proceeding.102
94 See id. at 288.
95 668 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (2d Dep't 1998).
96 See id. at 51-52.
97 See Pat's Carpet Outlet, Inc. v. State of New York Exec. Dep't, Div. of Human
Rights, 244 A.D.2d 338, 339 (2d Dep't 1997) ('extraordinary writ of prohibition may be
maintained solely to prevent a body or officer acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capac-
ity from proceeding or threatening to proceed without, or in excess of, its jurisdiction").
98 See People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d 881, 886 (N.Y. Sup. 1997).
99 See N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 168-d, -n (McKinney Supp. 1999).
100 See, e.g., Raphael S. v. Leventhal, 668 N.Y.S.2d 50, 50 (2d Dep't 1998) (holding
that relief is not available by way of application for writ of prohibition).
101 See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994). It should be noted that a
position was attributed to the Attorney General's office in Spencer, No Appeal in Megan's
Law Case Risk Level Decision Not Part of Sentence, Feb. 20, 1998 N.Y.L.J. (col. 3), that a
civil appeal from a judicial determination of a risk level determination lies in CPLR §
5701; however, we understand that the Attorney General's office was making a distinc-
tion between civil appeals and criminal appeals in the context of People v. Stevens, 91
N.Y.2d at 279.
102 See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994). The only questions that may
be raised in a proceeding under Article 78 are: "1. whether the body or officer failed to
perform a duty enjoined upon it by law; or 2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is
proceeding, or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or 3. whether a de-
termination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or
was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of pen-
alty or discipline imposed; or 4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing
held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the entire rec-
MGASLAW
The right of appeal or review from a judicial risk level deter-
mination apparently lies within CPLR Section 7803, subdivision
three and/or four, the so-called mandamus and certiorari right(s)
of review. The questions set forth in section 7803 of the CPLR
are relevant to sentencing courts' determinations of risk level
classifications of convicted sex offenders.103
It appears that an Article 78 proceeding challenging a sen-
tencing court's risk level determination can be "commenced in
the appellate division in the judicial department where
the... matter sought to be.. .restrained originated." 10 4 Notwith-
standing the apparent applicability of CPLR §7803(3) and/or (4)
to challenge(s) risk level determinations, two of the Judicial De-
partments in the state are in conflict as to such challenge(s). 105
In People v. Cash,10 6 the Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment held that the appropriate procedure for challenging risk
level determinations under SORA is by way of an Article 78 pro-
ceeding (although the Court did not specify under which subdivi-
sion thereof). A contrary holding was recently made by the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department in People v. Haddockl0 7
wherein on the court's own motion, two appeals from a risk level
classification were dismissed. Although the reported decision
makes no mention of Article 78, we understand the appeals were
brought by way of Article 78 (and not merely limited to the writ
of prohibition). The Court of Appeals recently denied certiorari
even though there is a clear split between the Second and Fourth
Departments.
Because of the unspecific language in Haddock, potential
challengers of risk level assessments are seemingly without a
remedy in the Second Department.10 8 Therefore, we are pres-
ord, supported by substantial evidence."
103 See id.
104 See id. § 506(b)(1).
105 There are two reported decisions from the Appellate Divisions which are in direct
conflict as to the right of appeal by way of CPLR 7803 as of this writing. See Raphael S.
v. Leventhal, 668 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (A.D.2d Dep't 1998) (holding that absence of right to
appeal did not compell conclusion that relief was available in writ of prohibition); People
v. Cash, 664 N.Y.S.2d 696, 696 (A.D.4th Dep't 1997) (explaining that proper procedure for
challenging SORA classification is Article 78).
106 664 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't 1997). Note that Cash was criticized in Raphael S. v.
Leventhal, 668 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (2d Dep't 1998), "to the extent that it holds that prohibi-
tion is available under these or similar circumstances". Id. at 659.
107 678 N.Y.S.2d 518 (2d Dep't 1998).
108 Fourteen days before rendering its decision in Haddock, the Appellate Division,
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ently in a situation where a perfectly viable avenue to challenge
a risk level determination by way of Article 78 subdivision (3)
and/or (4), is available in at least the Fourth Department, but is
seemingly foreclosed in the Second Department. Obviously, leg-
islative intervention is needed unless the Court of Appeals
grants certiorari on this issue and determines that Article 78,
subdivision (3) and/or (4) is available to challenge risk level de-
terminations. In the interim, it is hoped that any such Article 78
proceedings brought to challenge risk level determinations made
by the courts of this state will be reviewed by appellate courts.
CONCLUSION
SORA's procedures for classifying convicted sex offenders sub-
ject to its provisions appear to pass muster under the federal and
state constitutions. The two groups of convicted sex offenders
subject to SORA's provisions are not similarly situated for the
purposes of equal protection, and the different procedures appli-
cable to each group are logical and supported by strong legal
precedent. Further, each group is provided with procedural
safeguards to counter constitutional due process challenges.
The concern that convicted sex offenders might be misclassi-
fied is understandable. The Legislature appears, however, to
have provided sufficient safeguards to prevent such misclassifi-
cations and the Guidelines form a well reasoned standard of
measurement with the ability to depart therefrom when miti-
gating or aggravating factors are present.
In expressing concern for the rights of convicted sex offenders,
we must not completely lose sight of the purpose of SORA and
the unpleasant reality that sex offenders are unlikely to be
"cured" in the present system or rehabilitated in prison. Moreo-
ver, there is a dearth of programs and facilities to cure convicted
offenders once they are released, even assuming they would par-
ticipate in a curative program.10 9 In the district court's zeal to
Second Department held in People v. Kearns, 677 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2d Dep't 1998), that "the
sentencing court's assessment of the defendant as a 'sexually violent predator' under
[SORA]... is not reviewable." (citations omitted).
109 See A. Kenneth Fuller, M.D., Child Molestation and Pedophilia: An Overview for
the Physician, 261 J.A.M.A. 602 (1989) (observing that "[a] person with a history of rape
or child molestation stands on a different footing" than others inasmuch as "[h]is past
conduct provides evidence that he has the combination of aggressive and sexual impulses
that motivates the commission of such crimes, that he lacks effective inhibitions against
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protect convicted sex offenders who have been classified at high
risk levels, the court failed to consider the countless children
who may be sexually abused by these high level offenders,
pending appellate review of the decision in Doe v. Pataki or until
each offender comes before a court for a new assessment as
mandated by the Doe v. Pataki decision.
acting on these impulses, and that the risks involved do not deter him"); David J. Karp,
Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.
KENT. L. REV. 15, 20-21 (1994) (noting that it is difficult to stop rapists and child moles-
ters because of reluctance of many victims to report crime or testify).
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